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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 947 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 947 (1994), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional period of six months terminating on 31 March 1995. The present report is intended, in conjunction with the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 947 (1994) (S/1995/38) dated 14 January 1995, to assist the Council in its consideration of the mandate of UNPROFOR.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components. Its headquarters is in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 20 March 1995, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier of France, amounted to 38,599, including 684 United Nations military observers from 39 countries. (See annex III.) It is divided into three operational commands: UNPROFOR (Croatia) led by Major-General Eid Kamel Al-Rodan of Jordan, UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) led by Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and UNPROFOR (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) led by Brigadier-General Juha Engstrom of Finland. The Head of Civil Affairs reports to my Special Representative and is responsible for the civil affairs component which also includes 803 civilian police. There are 2,017 other international civilian staff (including 1,526 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,615 local staff.

III. CROATIA

A. The cease-fire agreement

3. Since my interim report to the Council of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), there has been a significant escalation in military activity and tension between the two sides. Violations of the cease-fire agreement have increased from 133 on 12 January 1995 to 218 on 7 March 1995. The climate of uncertainty since the announcement of the decision of the Croatian Government on 12 January 1995 to withdraw its support for UNPROFOR's continuing role after the expiry of the present mandate was compounded by the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 March 1995 to declare a state of "immediate war alert", which is the last step preceding full mobilization. Tension manifested itself in defensive preparations by both parties, including the construction of extensive trench works, the limited deployment of artillery and other heavy weapons from weapons storage sites to tactical positions and the increased presence of formed groups of soldiers within the zone of separation. There has been a marked lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR military units in the zone of separation and increased restrictions of movement on United Nations military observers in sensitive and tactically important areas. Promising local initiatives, launched in December 1994, for restoring compliance with the cease-fire agreement in Sector East have been reversed and increased military training exercises have been noted. Of particular concern has been the tactical deployment undertaken by both sides in order to be able to seize strategic ground in the zone of separation in anticipation of UNPROFOR ceasing its functions on 31 March 1995.

4. These developments represent a clear warning that, without the continued maintenance of stability between the parties in the zone of separation, the cease-fire agreement will unravel. Also of great concern are the military alliances that have been formed in the area, including the Joint Defence Council established between the Krajina Serb and Bosnian Serb armies on 19 February 1995 and the formation of the Joint Defence Council between the Croatian Government and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1995.

5. As military tension and uncertainty have increased, so have the anxiety and apprehension of residents in and near the zone of separation, particularly the minorities in the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs). Some 28,000 Croats are estimated to have remained in the areas, and approximately 5,000 Serbs live in the Croatian-administered section of UNPA Sector West. It should be noted that UNPROFOR has played a major role in protecting the rights of minorities in the protected areas and the Croat population there has been relatively stable since the cease-fire agreement, with fewer than 100 Croats seeking assistance to depart to Croatian-administered territory, mainly for family or medical reasons. While UNPROFOR has been successful in reducing crimes against minorities, it has been approached recently by hundreds of Croats requesting their immediate transfer to Croatian-administered areas should UNPROFOR depart.

6. Despite the increase in military tension, both sides have continued publicly to maintain their commitment to a peaceful resolution of their differences, and, for the past year, the cease-fire agreement has held remarkably well under the circumstances. United Nations civilian police

monitors (UNCIVPOL) have conducted over 13,000 patrols in the zone of separation since June 1994.

B. The economic agreement

7. The maintenance of the cease-fire agreement has been the essential foundation for the negotiation and implementation of the economic agreement. Despite the Croatian Government's announcement on 12 January 1995, both sides continued to cooperate fully in implementing the economic agreement until the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 February to postpone further negotiations and implementation - except for continued cooperation regarding the Zagreb-Lipovac highway and the oil pipeline through UNPA Sector North - until UNPROFOR's future presence in the protected areas was assured.

8. Prior to 8 February 1995, there was an impressive acceleration of both the negotiating process between the parties and the implementation of the economic agreement. Since 21 December 1994, over 200,000 vehicles have used the Zagreb-Lipovac highway, bringing substantial personal and economic improvements to both sides, with only a few sporadic incidents marring safe passage for increasing numbers of travellers. One hundred and forty UNCIVPOL monitors have conducted over 2,500 patrols along the highway, which is also protected in UNPA Sector West by 125 UNPROFOR military personnel. On 20 January 1995, the generator poles of the Obrovac hydroelectric station were returned to the Serb side, an essential step towards the restoration of electricity production in the area. On 26 January 1995, the oil pipeline was opened through UNPA Sector North, creating the possibility of significant revenue for Croatia from the transshipment of oil to Central European customers. On 27 January 1995, the first meeting of the Economic Joint Commission, co-chaired by representatives from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR, took place in Knin and agreed on the accelerated implementation of key economic projects, including the Zagreb-Okucani railway, on which mine-clearing operations commenced on 4 February 1995.

9. UNPROFOR personnel, including civil affairs staff and military engineers, were instrumental in setting up working-level meetings, arranging for exchanges of technical documents, conducting technical inspections and developing concepts of operations for 12 water and electricity rehabilitation projects. On the basis of technical inspections, it was estimated that, with full cooperation from both sides and moderate additional financial resources, the Petrinje-Sisak waterworks could have been fully restored by the end of February 1995, the Okucani railway could have been operational by 31 March 1995, and towns along the Dalmatian coast, including Zadar and Biograd, would have had adequate water supplies by this summer for the first time in four years.

10. Following the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 February 1995, my Special Representative as well as the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference made repeated efforts to resume implementation of the economic agreement and to continue direct negotiations between the parties. So far these efforts have not been successful, but preparatory work has continued by both sides on opening the Zagreb-Okucani railway, although implementation was firmly linked by the Serbs to renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate.

C. Political negotiations

11. Following President Tudjman's announcement on 12 January 1995, the "Zagreb-4" ambassadors, comprising the United States and Russian ambassadors to Croatia and Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide from the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, presented a "Draft agreement on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium" to both sides on 30 January 1995. While the Croatian Government accepted the plan as a basis for negotiation, the Serbs in Knin refused to receive it until the future presence of UNPROFOR was assured. Subject to the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, the Serbs expressed their readiness to enter into political discussions from 1 April.

D. Humanitarian issues

12. Further to my report of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), UNPROFOR and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have continued to assist in facilitating the voluntary return of displaced people to their homes in those areas where return can take place in conditions of security and dignity, and in accordance with humanitarian principles. They have also acted as a catalyst to mobilize assistance from other organizations and coordinate their efforts in this regard. The security situation along the zone of separation has improved and stabilized under the cease-fire agreement to the extent that several thousand displaced persons have returned to their homes of their own volition. However, large-scale returns have not been possible in the absence of substantial progress towards a political settlement. It would, moreover, have been contrary to international humanitarian law and practice for the United Nations to encourage returns to areas that remained insecure as a result of high levels of hostility or widespread mine-infestation, and where the human rights of minorities could not be guaranteed.

13. During the period under review, UNPROFOR continued its humanitarian activities, including assisting UNHCR and other agencies in the transport and distribution of humanitarian aid, protecting minorities in the United Nations protected areas, and in seeking to develop humanitarian confidence-building measures. In Sector North, UNPROFOR's role was vital in helping UNHCR to assist 30,000 refugees from the Bihac pocket who fled into the sector in August and did not return to Velika Kladusa until the end of December 1994. Similarly, UNPROFOR committed substantial resources in support of UNHCR to protect and assist some 15,000 refugees expelled from the Banja Luka area during their transit through Sector West, pending their admission to refugee centres by the Croatian authorities.

14. A continuing grave problem was Serb obstruction of the passage through the United Nations protected areas of convoys for humanitarian relief and UNPROFOR resupply. Despite numerous promises from the Serb leadership, deliberate bureaucratic and armed obstruction of convoys placed the lives and welfare of United Nations personnel and aid recipients at risk.

E. The Prevlaka peninsula

15. The demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, which was achieved under UNPROFOR supervision following the adoption of Security Council resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, significantly contributed to normalizing the security situation in this area although a certain number of incidents did occur. The area remains of considerable strategic importance to both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Thus the construction, in recent months, of extensive Croatian defences within the "yellow" and "blue" zones, along with challenges to UNPROFOR's interpretation of the established security regime, has had a destabilizing influence. I should therefore like to reiterate the view reflected in my report of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067) that an UNPROFOR withdrawal before a final political settlement is reached would increase the risk of renewed hostilities in this area. The recent rise in tensions is of serious concern and I have requested my Special Representative, in cooperation with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference, to renew his efforts to ensure full compliance by the parties with the security regime established in the Prevlaka peninsula.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A. Military situation

16. In my report to the Council of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067), I noted that, while significant progress had been made in stabilizing the military situation in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, events in recent months had demonstrated the fragility of the peace on the ground. I pointed out that military restraint by the warring parties in some areas was undermined by aggressive acts in others, resulting in a marked variation in progress towards normalization of life in different parts of the country. I also stressed, however, that the continuation of warfare in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be allowed to obscure the largely successful peace-keeping work carried out by the Force. These observations are even more relevant today.

17. Immediately following the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could generally be described as unstable. There was fighting in most areas of the country, including around Sarajevo. Relations between the Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR were poor but, in spite of this, some progress was made on humanitarian issues. During the period from 1 October 1994 to 18 December 1994, the urban area of Sarajevo remained largely free from fighting. Shelling, sniping and military engagements were all at low levels and the heavy weapons exclusion zone was generally respected. Elsewhere in the Sarajevo area, however, there was more activity. Bosnian Government forces launched a series of attacks on Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in the area of Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica, gaining approximately 100 square kilometres of territory. To prosecute their offensive, Bosnian Army troops transited the "Igman demilitarized zone", which represented a clear violation of the agreement of 14 August 1993. UNPROFOR obtained numerous undertakings from the Bosnian authorities indicating that they would return to compliance with the agreement. Despite this, the Bosnian Army continued to use the zone for military purposes, and UNPROFOR's apparent failure to stop them was the cause of considerable

friction between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb side. On 22 September 1994, following a Bosnian Serb Army attack on an UNPROFOR vehicle resulting in the serious wounding of one soldier, close air support was utilized. The Bosnian Serb Army threatened to retaliate against UNPROFOR and, on 25 September, flights into Sarajevo airport were suspended for several weeks in view of security threats against aircraft.

18. Despite the blockade of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, humanitarian supplies in the city never fell to critical levels as a large stockpile of basic commodities had been built up. Utilities were, however, at minimal levels and there was a long interruption in gas supplies to Sarajevo in November 1994. There was almost no freedom of movement for local civilians seeking to enter or leave the city. None the less, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb leaders signed a significant agreement on the release of prisoners and other humanitarian issues at the beginning of October, following an intense negotiating effort involving leading political and military officials. The agreement called for the release of several hundred prisoners from jails in Konjic, Gorazde, Foca, Visegrad and elsewhere. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow UNHCR to move a total of nine convoys into Gorazde in the following seven-day period, and to allow a limited number of civilians to move in or out of the pocket. As a result of this agreement, the largest exchange of prisoners since the beginning of the war took place between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs on 6 October 1994. Two hundred and ninety-five prisoners were released across the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge in Sarajevo, 129 persons from the Government side and 166 from the Bosnian Serb side. At the same time, 40 medical cases were evacuated from Gorazde, 47 Bosnian Serbs left the enclave, and 7 special UNHCR food convoys entered it as part of the overall agreement. At the last minute, the parties themselves made an agreement under which 133 Muslim civilians were exchanged at the bridge for 11 Bosnian Serb civilians.

19. The overall situation deteriorated, however, and reached crisis point in late November, when the Bosnian Serbs entered the designated safe area of Bihac in repulsing an offensive launched in October from the Bihac pocket by the Bosnian Army. Following air attacks by Krajina Serbs into the Bihac pocket on 18 and 19 November 1994, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes on the Udbina airfield in UNPA Sector South in Croatia and on Bosnian Serb missile sites on 21 and 23 November 1994 respectively, the situation sharply worsened. Severe restrictions were imposed on UNPROFOR movements within Sector Sarajevo, all Bosnian Serb checkpoints were closed, some 250 troops were confined within weapons collection points and 26 United Nations military observers were detained in their quarters. Elsewhere, convoys with 165 UNPROFOR soldiers destined for the "safe areas" were held at Bosnian Serb checkpoints at Zvornik, Rogatica and Usti Praca and 55 soldiers were detained in Ilijas. While there was no direct targeting of United Nations aircraft, Sarajevo airport had to be closed as a safety measure. The viability of UNPROFOR's mission was seriously threatened.

20. On 30 November 1994, I paid a visit to Sarajevo in order to express to both sides my strong concern regarding the need for a cease-fire and negotiations between the parties. Though I met with President Izetbegovic, my meeting with Mr. Karadzic did not take place as a result of differences on the venue of the

meeting. Immediately following my visit, a period of intense negotiations for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities was commenced by my Special Representative. The visit of former United States President Jimmy Carter to Sarajevo and Pale in mid-December greatly facilitated this process and led to the Bosnian Serbs announcing their willingness to agree to a cease-fire. Following President Carter's visit, my Special Representative was able to secure a cease-fire agreement between the sides on 23 December 1994 and a cessation-of-hostilities agreement on 31 December 1994 (S/1995/8). The latter agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995, included nine basic elements: a four-month cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a joint commission to oversee implementation of the agreement; an exchange of liaison officers; the separation of forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons and interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops along the line of confrontation; freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, particularly for the purpose of delivering aid and monitoring human rights; compliance with earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo and certain areas in eastern Bosnia; restoration of utilities and joint economic activities; release of prisoners and provision of information on missing persons; and cooperation with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and withdrawal of foreign troops. On 2 January 1995, Bosnian Croat leaders joined the agreements brokered by my Special Representative.

21. Implementation of the agreements concluded in the last week of 1994 has been the principal focus of UNPROFOR's activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the beginning of January. In the first month following the cease-fire and cessation-of-hostilities agreements, military activities of all the parties declined substantially throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, except in the area of Bihac. There was a marked improvement in the quality of life for the citizens of Sarajevo and significant gains in freedom of movement and in the humanitarian situation throughout the country. Significant progress was achieved on some of the provisions of paragraph 6 of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, which reaffirmed earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Gorazde. The parties agreed that UNPROFOR would open the roads around Sarajevo, closed since July 1994, when the Bosnian side evacuated the Mount Igman demilitarized zone. A series of follow-up agreements established a mechanism for verifying the withdrawal of Bosnian Government forces and determined the timetable and regime according to which the roads around Sarajevo would be opened, first for a limited number of "official international humanitarian organizations" and then for civilians and other humanitarian organizations. A joint reconnaissance of the Mount Igman demilitarized zone was undertaken which verified the Bosnian Government's evacuation of the area, although UNPROFOR continued to observe Bosnian Army troops transiting through the zone.

22. Progress on the Mount Igman issue made progress possible on the issue of the routes and, on 1 February 1995, the airport roads were opened for the first category of humanitarian organizations. No further agreement was possible, however, and on 5 February UNPROFOR informed the two sides that the airport roads would be opened the next day for civilian traffic only. Three days later, the bus route from Sarajevo to Visoko, via Serb-controlled territory, was opened on the same basis. During February, 116,000 people crossed the airport roads, with some 88,000 people travelling between the two Bosnian Government-controlled areas and 28,000 between the two Bosnian Serb-controlled areas. The route to Visoko was also used by civilians travelling in buses, though on a smaller

scale. This road was closed by the Bosnian Serbs three weeks later. Following the killing of two Serb girls in March by a Bosnian sniper, the airport roads were closed by the Bosnian Serbs and remain closed.

23. Despite the general success of the cease-fire agreement and some success on the provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, little progress was achieved in January on the provisions relating to the separation of forces, interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The vital mechanism of Joint Commissions failed to function as a result of the refusal of both sides to participate in Commission meetings. These developments, coupled with the refusal of the Bosnian Government to accept the placement of Bosnian Serb liaison officers at UNPROFOR Sector headquarters on Bosnian Government-controlled territory and continued military preparations by the parties, gave rise to concerns about the long-term viability of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. It increasingly appeared that the parties' principal objective was a winter truce, during which the combatants would be able to rest, reorganize and train in preparation for a future offensive. A continued lack of cooperation on these issues in February 1995, in addition to persistent attacks and counter-attacks in the Bihac area, illustrated the fragility of the situation and gave further grounds for fearing renewed hostilities at or before the expiration of the four-month cessation-of-hostilities agreement.

24. The Bosnian Government has already made it clear to UNPROFOR that it is not interested in extending the agreement if the Bosnian Serbs are unwilling to accept the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group, at least as a starting point for negotiations. Government forces have begun to apply significant restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement in government-controlled territory, resulting in lack of access for UNPROFOR to certain areas of central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb leadership, for its part, has also prepared itself for further hostilities. While Bosnian Serb controls on UNPROFOR eased considerably in the early stages of the cessation-of-hostilities, a marked deterioration in UNPROFOR's freedom of movement in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas has become apparent in recent weeks. The Bosnian Serb side has imposed tight controls on supplies to the enclaves, particularly on fuel and medical supplies, and has indicated that it will renew hostilities unless the Bosnian Government immediately complies with the provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. As a result of the current impasse, the security situation in Sarajevo has begun to deteriorate, with increasing sniping at civilians and targeting of UNPROFOR and UNHCR aircraft.

25. Fighting and blockage of delivery of supplies continue in the Bihac pocket in north-western Bosnia. UNPROFOR's repeated efforts to achieve a cease-fire in the Bihac region have failed and military activities continue, particularly to the north of the pocket, where forces loyal to Mr. Fikret Abdic battle the Bosnian Government's forces. On 12 December 1994, the Krajina Serbs or their allies, the forces of Mr. Abdic, specifically targeted a Bangladeshi armoured personnel carrier, killing one soldier and seriously wounding five others. The role of the Krajina Serbs, in the present situation and throughout the Bihac crisis, requires special mention. They have launched artillery and ground attacks across the international border and have provided active support from the United Nations protected areas for the Abdic-led forces in the Bihac pocket.

In addition, since June 1994, Krajina Serbs have continued their policy of obstructing humanitarian aid and supplies to the Bangladeshi battalion. UNHCR has managed to deliver only 15 per cent of its target to the Bihac pocket during the reporting period. This has led to a mounting crisis in the Bosnian Government-controlled portion of the pocket where there is fear of imminent widespread malnutrition. The Krajina Serbs continue to frustrate both UNPROFOR and UNHCR by their insistence that convoys should pass only through territory controlled by Mr. Abdic, and by subjecting convoy personnel to erratic and obstructive "checking", as well as to the dangers of either deliberate targeting or being caught in cross-fire. Repeated attempts of my Special Representative, in coordination with UNHCR, to gain regular access to the Bihac pocket, without traversing Velika Kladusa, have not met with success.

26. The complexity of the situation in the Bihac pocket, where five more or less distinct parties can be identified, poses a daunting challenge for UNPROFOR. In the south, near Bihac town, the situation is at an impasse. The Bosnian Serbs insist that the Bosnian Government forces return to the positions they occupied at the signing of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. The Bosnian Government, having retaken control of the safe area and its water supply, has refused this demand and insisted that the Krajina Serb forces withdraw from the Bihac pocket, as foreseen under paragraph 9 of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. In the north, near Velika Kladusa, the fighting continues with no solution in sight and the Krajina Serbs remain actively involved. The resultant instability makes it unlikely that UNHCR will achieve the access necessary to keep the population in the south of the pocket properly nourished and the prospect of an UNPROFOR withdrawal from the protected areas in Croatia makes the aid and resupply situation even more tenuous. Should the situation fester, Bihac could again become a flash-point for wider conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27. In this connection, I should like once again to draw the attention of the Security Council to my reports on the safe areas in documents S/1994/555 of 9 May and S/1994/1389 of 1 December 1994, upon which the Council has not yet acted.

B. Action plan for Sarajevo

28. The work of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo has, during the reporting period, been directly affected by the changing situation in and around Sarajevo. Conditions deteriorated considerably during the last quarter of 1994 as restrictions on access were tightened and shelling and sniping increased. By December, conditions in Sarajevo were such that some people questioned whether implementation of any sizable portion of the action plan was likely in the foreseeable future. This rather bleak picture changed appreciably for the better following the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. As a result of the opening of the Sarajevo airport roads in February 1995, commodities, including those required for the implementation of the action plan, could be brought into the city. In fact, trucks carrying materials for the action plan projects were among the first to cross the airport roads under the new agreement. In addition, project formulation and financing are gathering speed. At present, about 20 Trust Fund projects are either under implementation or

awaiting approval, including projects for the repair of roads, improvement of water quality, a gas safety campaign and the purchase of garbage trucks. Another action plan project at an early stage of preparation concerns the restoration of the Sarajevo-Ploce railway line.

29. While a great deal of work remains to be done, the prospects for the Office of the Special Coordinator to make substantial progress in restoring essential services to Sarajevo appeared until recent days to be brighter than they had been for some considerable time. However, they remained dependent upon the continuance of relative peace in and around Sarajevo and upon access to the city remaining as it was or, better still, improving. In the event of a resumption of hostilities and lasting closure of the airport routes, efforts at restoring essential services to the city would inevitably be severely compromised.

C. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

30. In contrast to the difficulties in achieving full implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in some areas, substantial progress has been achieved in improving relations between the Bosniac and Bosnian Croat parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now one year old, the Federation demonstrates that, with the assistance of the international community, former adversaries can stop fighting and cooperate on questions of mutual political, economic and humanitarian benefit. Throughout the contiguous territory of the Federation, UNPROFOR has played a major role in supporting the peace process. UNPROFOR battalions have monitored the cease-fire of February 1994 and the buffer zone between the parties, overseen the separation of forces and controlled heavy weapons through the establishment of weapons collections points and active sites. In Mostar, through agreement reached with the European Union Administration of that city, UNPROFOR has monitored the process of demilitarization and provided a secure environment for the Administration to operate. UNPROFOR battalions have also provided human resources for the restoration of infrastructure. Roads and bridges have been rebuilt by UNPROFOR; water, sewage, and telephone systems have been repaired with UNPROFOR's assistance. The results are impressive. Power lines have been restored to over 90 per cent of the villages in the Federation territory. Electricity production has increased by at least 50 per cent. Thousands of people have been able to move freely through UNPROFOR-controlled checkpoints. However, problems persist in relations between the two communities, particularly in respect of freedom of movement between territories controlled by each party, and tensions have arisen that continue to require the vigilant efforts of the international community.

31. The Joint Commission Policy Committee (JCPC), established under the auspices of UNPROFOR, has brought the Federation parties together to address a wide range of political, military, social and economic issues. JCPC has proved to be an effective joint structure that has taken the lead in identifying and resolving problems and ensuring communications between the two communities. It is only through the process of fostering Bosniac-Croat relations at all levels that the further goals of the Federation can be achieved. It is hoped that the parties will avail themselves of the services of UNCIVPOL in the creation of joint municipal, cantonal and federal police forces. Unfortunately, the work of

JCPC is now stalled over the Bosnian Government's insistence on the departure of the Bosnian Serb liaison officer from the town of Gornji Vakuf.

32. This suspension of the JCPC process is symptomatic of the wider failure of the parties to cooperate on fundamental issues such as the return of displaced persons to their homes and the formation and functioning of Federation institutions. Despite the vigorous efforts of the European Union in Mostar, further steps towards reconciliation have been resisted by one of the parties, though it is hoped that recent high-level agreements may finally break the impasse. Nevertheless, the danger remains that the unresolved issues may unravel the progress achieved so far, and that frustration may lead to friction between the communities, with serious consequences for the future of the Federation. I have therefore instructed UNPROFOR to continue to work at all levels to help to consolidate the Federation.

D. Humanitarian and human rights issues

33. During the period November-December 1994, UNHCR found humanitarian access very difficult and problematic. However, after the conclusion of the comprehensive cease-fire agreement and the agreement on the cessation-of-hostilities in December, UNHCR has enjoyed adequate access to the enclaves and Sarajevo in respect of delivery of food, fuel and winterization materials, although the delivery of medical supplies was frequently obstructed. In Bihac, however, UNHCR failed to obtain regular access. Furthermore, there was a deterioration in the situation in Sarajevo leading to the suspension of the airlift in the latter part of March, with a corresponding decline in humanitarian resupply of the city.

34. As described in my last report to the Council, serious violations of human rights have persisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Bosnian Serb-controlled territory. Recently, UNHCR has reported on a new wave of attacks against minorities in the Banja Luka area, in which Muslim houses have been systematically robbed and their occupants terrorized. In pursuance of relevant Security Council resolutions and presidential statements, and in line with the implementation of the human rights aspects of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, UNPROFOR has repeatedly sought, without success, the deployment of civil affairs and civilian police monitors into areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. During a visit of the UNPROFOR Head of Civil Affairs to Banja Luka with a team of civil affairs officers on 21 and 22 January 1995, the question of the protection of minorities was raised with the Banja Luka authorities. Despite assurances received from the Bosnian Serbs that civil affairs officers could continue making visits to Banja Luka and the Doboj regions, the Bosnian Serbs, on 25 February, demanded the removal of UNPROFOR's recently installed civil affairs presence in Banja Luka. (UNPROFOR has since received assurances that future visits will be allowed, on certain conditions.) Around the same time, the UNPROFOR Civilian Police Commissioner was informed of the Bosnian Serbs' objection to the deployment of civilian police monitors on their territory. Some progress has, however, been made with an agreement for the establishment of a Civil Affairs Office in the Serb-controlled area of Grbavica in Sarajevo.

35. A significant step forward in the promotion of human rights in the territory of the Federation has been made with the establishment of three ombudsmen in Sarajevo, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Following a request by OSCE, UNPROFOR civilian and civil police monitors will facilitate the work of the ombudsmen. In addition, a comprehensive plan for the deployment of UNPROFOR civilian police monitors in Federation territory, supported by the Bosnian Government, is under discussion with local authorities. The plan envisages the deployment of an additional 60 civilian police assigned to the Federation, mainly to deal with the treatment of minorities.

E. Cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

36. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has continued to support the United Nations with substantial maritime and aerial operations. The joint NATO/Western European Union operation "Sharp Guard" enforces the Adriatic embargo in accordance with Council resolution 820 (1993) while operation "Deny Flight" continues to provide aerial monitoring and enforcement of the "no-fly-zone", as well as protective close air support, air strikes and the enhancement of the security of the United Nations-designated safe areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina when requested by UNPROFOR. The "no-fly-zone" enforcement has successfully prevented the use by the warring sides of offensive air power, and the availability of NATO air power has considerably strengthened UNPROFOR's bargaining position in negotiating convoy clearances. In the event of increased hostilities or the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the deterrent value and possible employment of air power will be vital to the security of UNPROFOR personnel.

37. At my request, NATO has devoted considerable resources to contingency planning and other preparations to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or Croatia. This activity has been performed in close coordination, and in an excellent spirit of cooperation, with UNPROFOR.

38. I would like to emphasize that, despite regular and frequent infringements of the "no-fly-zone" by helicopters and some occasional fixed-wing activity, I remain convinced that the deterrent effect of NATO operations has contributed to the effective containment of warring faction air activity for combat purposes. I place a high value on the security that UNPROFOR derives from NATO's operations and contingency measures, and welcome the continued excellent cooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO at all levels.

V. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

39. The internal political situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over the last six months has been dominated by three events - the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in October 1994; the announcement of the 1994 census results; and heightened tensions between the Government and elements in the ethnic Albanian population, as well as between the Government and nationalist elements in the ethnic Macedonian majority.

40. Within the good offices function of my Special Representative provided for in paragraph 12 of Council resolution 908 (1994), the delegate of my Special Representative, upon the invitation of the President of the Parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, joined the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and other international organizations in monitoring the parliamentary and presidential elections held in October 1994. While certain irregularities were noted in the elections, the overall opinion of the observers was that the elections had been conducted in a generally orderly, regular and peaceful manner. However, the two major opposition parties within the country, VRMO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party, considered the first round of the elections to have been fraudulent. As a result, they boycotted the second round, leading to the parties already in power securing an overwhelming majority of 95 of the 120 seats in Parliament. The parties that boycotted the elections hold influence over a significant portion of the electorate; as they now recognize neither the Parliament nor the President, a situation exists that is not conducive to constructive political dialogue.

41. As reported to the Council on 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067), the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia conducted a nationwide census from 25 June to 11 July 1994 in order to establish accurate estimates of the ethnic composition of the population. This exercise was monitored, financed and partly organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union. In November 1994, the Government announced the results, which showed that 67 per cent of the resident population in the Republic were ethnic Macedonians, 23 per cent were ethnic Albanians, and the remaining 10 per cent were formed of Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Gypsies and people of non-identified ethnicity. Despite verification by international observers of the veracity of the results and the proper conduct of the census, ethnic Albanian leaders have disputed the results.

42. Recently, some leaders of the ethnic Albanian population have stepped up demands for improvements in their political, economic, social, cultural and educational status, including recognition of Albanian as the Republic's second official language. There has been a confrontation between some ethnic Albanians and the Government over action by the former to establish an Albanian-language university in Tetovo. The ethnic Albanian leaders involved in this effort have argued that the State's two existing universities in Skopje and Bitola, whose instruction is in the Macedonian language, as well as the Pedagogical Academy in Skopje, which recently restored some instruction in the Albanian language, are not sufficient, and that an Albanian-language university is therefore required. The Government takes the view that the project to establish such a university outside the State system is against the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and has charged that the supporters of the project are using a purportedly educational issue to advance their political ambitions of "federalization", aimed eventually at creating a greater Albania. Police have intervened on several occasions to halt the project, culminating in an incident on 17 February in which, during a demonstration in Tetovo in support of the project, one ethnic Albanian was shot dead, and a number of policemen injured. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has filed criminal charges against five supporters of the project. Shortly after this incident, ethnic Albanian members of Parliament, who hold 19 of the 120 seats in Parliament, boycotted

parliamentary sessions in support of their demands for use of Albanian as the second official language.

43. Internal political, social and inter-ethnic difficulties continue to be exacerbated by the fragile state of the country's economy. Approximately 30 per cent of the workforce is unemployed; the inflation rate for 1994 exceeded 50 per cent. The trade embargo imposed by Greece in February 1994, as well as United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), continue to disrupt severely the country's principal export/import routes on its southern and northern borders. In addition, international investors have shown reluctance to invest in the country. The Government is, however, making great efforts to transform the economy to a free-market system, and is receiving some assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and individual Member States. The economy is showing signs of strength in some areas, but still faces great challenges and needs further international support.

44. UNPROFOR's mission to monitor and report along the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Albania reveals no current military threat. Since my last report, however, there has been no decisive move towards establishing a clear international border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Following incidents in the area of the disputed border between the two countries in the summer of 1994, UNPROFOR negotiated a military administrative boundary between the two parties that determines the northern limit of the area of operation for UNPROFOR troops. Although neither Government acknowledges the military administrative boundary as a legitimate international border, both sides use it for the reporting and management of border-crossing incidents. While UNPROFOR has monitored military patrols from both countries crossing the boundary, it has observed no tension between the sides. However, the potential for confrontation still exists in the absence of a mutually recognized international border and it remains of primary importance that a joint border commission begin work to resolve this long-outstanding issue.

VI. OTHER MATTERS

A. Human rights

45. UNPROFOR's widespread presence throughout the mission area, the close liaison with local authorities effected by its civil affairs component and the mandate conferred upon CIVPOL by the Security Council have encouraged UNPROFOR to intensify its efforts to enhance respect for the human rights of minority populations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Following discussions with UNHCR, the Centre for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNPROFOR took the initiative to form an Inter-Agency Working Group on Human Rights Issues under the chairmanship of the Head of Civil Affairs on 13 January 1995. The Working Group, which meets on an as-needed basis, has capitalized on the various bodies' common interest in improving respect for human rights throughout the mission area, to share resources, reduce duplication and coordinate ongoing efforts to

promote pluralism in the communities in which the Force is deployed. Representatives from OSCE and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) are also invited to participate when issues germane to their activities are addressed.

46. With due consideration for the constraints imposed by the scope of each agency's mandate and the need to guarantee respect for confidentiality, the Working Group has sought to maximize the efficiency and efficacy of human rights monitoring by encouraging information-sharing. In agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso, the Working Group has also launched a series of training sessions to enable field officers deployed throughout the mission area to understand their role and the resources available to them in protecting human rights. In this connection, the Working Group has developed an information package containing the primary international documents on human rights for dissemination to field officers and expects to form a cadre of human rights trainers in the near term. The Working Group has also encouraged field staff to support local NGOs and civic groups in their defence of human rights.

B. Public information

47. Since its establishment in February 1994, UNPROFOR's Division of Information has developed and implemented a far-reaching press and public information programme for the populations in the mission area. Publications, print products and radio and television programmes to inform the public about UNPROFOR's mission, mandate and activities are produced in local languages on a continual basis and are widely disseminated throughout the mission area. Press and public information offices have been established in Sarajevo, the four United Nations protected areas, Skopje, Belgrade and most recently in Sectors South-West and North-East in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

48. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 947 (1994) of 30 September 1994, by which the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's report of 17 September 1994, UNPROFOR has been actively working to establish a radio station that would broadcast local-language programmes about United Nations activities throughout its mission area. After a series of contacts with the Croatian broadcasting authorities, UNPROFOR was informed in February 1995 that it would be allocated three FM frequencies for radio broadcasts restricted to the protected areas. UNPROFOR is currently discussing with the Croatian Government the possibility of obtaining frequencies that would reach all of Croatia, but the Croatian authorities have so far been unwilling to authorize them. They have also insisted on the payment of substantial fees for the allocation of frequencies in the protected areas.

49. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, fruitful discussions have been held with the relevant government bodies with regard to the establishment of an UNPROFOR broadcast radio facility. In meetings earlier this year, the Ministry of Transport and Communications requested that UNPROFOR first clarify a number of outstanding issues with regard to communications frequencies, prior to the allocation of FM radio frequencies for its use. Significant steps have been taken by UNPROFOR to comply with this request, and it is expected that the

allocation of FM frequencies for UNPROFOR radio broadcasts and permission to establish transmitter sites will be granted in the very near future. It should be noted that the Bosnian Serb authorities have consistently refused to allow UNPROFOR to broadcast its radio or television programmes in territories under their control.

50. UNPROFOR television programmes in local languages are broadcast regularly twice per week on national television stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. More than 100 programmes about United Nations work in the former Yugoslavia and current events have been produced. Programmes are also occasionally broadcast on Croatian television, although the Croatian television authorities have been unwilling to grant UNPROFOR regular broadcast slots.

51. The Security Council may wish to consider calling upon all Governments and authorities in the UNPROFOR mission area to co-operate with the United Nations in the provision of suitable radio broadcasting frequencies and television broadcast slots, at no cost to the Organization, in order to help it to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Council.

C. Mine-related activities

52. While mine-awareness training has continued to be implemented throughout the Force, UNPROFOR has continued to suffer mine-related casualties, with 25 personnel injured in 16 incidents over the period from October 1994 to March 1995. In Croatia, local reluctance to support mine-clearance in the protected areas has generally increased and a significant amount of new mining within the zone of separation has occurred on both sides. Such activities have been protested when discovered and the mines cleared where possible. Since 8 February 1995, the Krajina Serbs have refused to cooperate in any mine-clearance activity. Without the participation of both sides, mine-clearance in Croatia has virtually ceased.

53. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, mine-clearance in support of United Nations operations has continued on a sporadic basis. Of note, however, is Sector South-West, which has continued to pursue mine-clearance actively in support of infrastructure restoration projects in the Vitez pocket and Mostar.

54. At present, a number of initiatives are being taken to improve mine capabilities within the Force, in accordance with my report of 17 September and as endorsed by the Council in resolution 947 (1994). These include the setting up of a new mine-information system, the use of mine-sensing dogs, an increase in mine-roller systems, and a mine-coordination centre for control and coordination of all mine-related activities throughout the mission.

D. Status-of-forces agreements

55. In paragraph 25 of my report of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), I drew attention to the lack of progress in concluding a status-of-forces agreement

between UNPROFOR and the Republic of Croatia. This situation continues. I wish to draw attention in particular to the difficulties and expense caused to UNPROFOR by the fact that it has not been provided with adequate premises and facilities, free of cost, as envisaged in the model status-of-forces agreement (see A/45/594). UNPROFOR has had to rent premises at substantial cost and even to pay taxes on the purchase of fuel, tolls for the use of highways, etc., in all cases under protest and with intimation to the authorities that claims will be lodged. The position taken by the Government of Croatia directly contravenes Security Council resolution 908 (1994), paragraph 7. The establishment of UNPROFOR's headquarters and principal logistic bases in Croatia without the prior conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement has increasingly added to the difficulties and overall costs of the mission. While the Croatian authorities were most cooperative and generous during the initial phase of the mission, there have been recent indications that UNPROFOR's continuing use of Croatian facilities is being approached on a commercial basis. This may have contributed to the imposition on UNPROFOR of a fuel tax of $8.6 million from July to December 1994 and airport charges of $2.5 million from January to December 1994, all of which are inconsistent with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which the Government of Croatia is a party.

56. The status-of-forces agreement with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 May 1993) regulates UNPROFOR's presence in that country, although it cannot be said that UNPROFOR has been provided free of cost with the various premises it requires, as called for by the agreement. The Government has recently demanded that UNPROFOR surrender certain facilities it occupies and pay rent on others. Such demands are inconsistent with the status-of-forces agreement. Moreover, the Bosnian Government has indicated its desire to reopen negotiations on certain aspects of that agreement, particularly those relating to the terms and conditions for locally employed staff members. UNPROFOR has expressed its concern to the Government over the increasing incidents of taxation of local staff members, the forcible mobilization of employees of draft age, and the detention of those staff members who fail to comply with mobilization orders.

57. By an exchange of letters dated 13 March 1995 between my Special Representative, and the Minister for Foreign Relations of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, an agreement was reached between the United Nations and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of UNPROFOR and its personnel in that host country.

58. There has also been no progress so far on the conclusion of the necessary arrangements with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Security Council may wish to reiterate its call on the Governments concerned to conclude such agreements without delay. This is particularly important in respect of the Government of Croatia, whose economy profits considerably from the presence of the United Nations on its territory.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

59. In my interim report to the Council of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38) I noted that, despite the earlier inability of UNPROFOR to fulfil important parts of its mandate under the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia, the successful

implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the conclusion of the economic agreement on 2 December 1994 had been positive steps towards confidence-building and reconciliation. I expressed disappointment that the potential for success through the three-step approach - cessation of hostilities, economic normalization and political negotiations - had not been fully explored before the Croatian Government's decision on 12 January 1995 to withdraw its support for UNPROFOR's continuing role.

60. Over the past two months, the escalation of military activity and tension, the suspension of further cooperation in the implementation of the economic agreement and the continued failure of the parties to commence serious political negotiations have brought them to the brink of a major war. I therefore welcome the fact that President Tudjman, through his announcement on 12 March 1995 (S/1995/206), has recognized the grave dangers that would result from the premature departure of the United Nations peace-keeping force from Croatia and has agreed to its retention for the time being. While there are many factors that have precipitated the present crisis, the principal underlying cause has been the lingering lack of trust and confidence between the parties and the resultant political stalemate for the past three years, leading to fears on the Croatian side that a peaceful political settlement is unattainable and providing encouragement to hardliners on the Krajina Serb side to think that independence or union in a "Greater Serbia" are realistic options.

61. It should be recalled that the first principle of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan of 11 December 1991 (S/23280, annex III), to which all the parties had agreed, was that the arrangements for a United Nations peace-keeping operation would be of an interim nature, pending the negotiation of an overall settlement. As noted in my report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592), these arrangements "... will be without prejudice to that settlement or to the principle that the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia cannot be changed by force or without the consent of the parties concerned."

62. Over the past three years, UNPROFOR's activities in Croatia have succeeded to a large extent in establishing the cessation of hostilities that was essential for political dialogue to begin. The implementation of the economic agreement has, in a short time, demonstrated that the two communities can interact with each other in peaceful endeavours and with mutual benefits. The best efforts of UNPROFOR have not, however, produced political movement in a time-frame that is acceptable to the Government of Croatia and to the thousands of displaced Croats who wish to return to their homes in the United Nations protected areas. On the Krajina Serb side, apprehension and mistrust of the Government, together with internal political turmoil, have continued to inhibit participation in a political process that would lead to the integration of the protected areas into the Croatian State. It is significant that there appears to be very little pressure from the estimated 200,000 displaced Serbs to return to their homes in government-administered territory.

63. Many misperceptions have arisen about UNPROFOR's fundamental tasks in Croatia. As the Council considers the question of maintaining a United Nations peace-keeping presence there, it is timely for me to restate the basic principles of such a presence. A United Nations peace-keeping force can operate effectively only with the consent and full cooperation of the parties. It is an

interim measure whose purpose is to help the parties to find a durable peace based on agreement between the parties themselves. It is not intended nor equipped to impose a solution on the parties. In the specific case of Croatia, it is without prejudice to an eventual political settlement. Thus the zone of separation is a temporary measure to halt the fighting, create conditions for political negotiations and begin the process of restoring normal life.

64. It is my considered view that the three-phase process of negotiations is the only practical path to durable peace. The initial gains of the economic agreement, while affected by the limited resources available, have been significant, but they cannot be a substitute for political negotiations. In advancing towards a political settlement, the negotiations must be underpinned by consistent and conscientious policies, led by the Government of Croatia, of national reconciliation and trust-building between the two parties. These policies should include a comprehensive amnesty, freedom of travel, free access to the media and encouragement of human contacts at the grass-roots level. Improvement in the observance of human rights, including full international monitoring, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence and durable peace, while inflammatory and provocative rhetoric from either side endangers the peace process. All parties should refrain from such rhetoric and allow the establishment and unhampered functioning of objective and independent media. It should also be clearly accepted by the parties that all displaced persons have the right to return to their homes in conditions of safety, security and dignity.

65. In considering the United Nations future peace-keeping role in Croatia, I remain conscious of the likelihood of a renewal and widening of hostilities should UNPROFOR depart precipitously. I am also conscious of the potential for positive results from the implementation of the economic agreement and from the agreement of the Krajina Serb leadership to commence serious political negotiations as soon as the future presence of a United Nations peace-keeping force is assured.

66. Before President Tudjman's announcement of his agreement to the retention of a United Nations peace-keeping force, I had been examining the full range of options available. These included the retention of UNPROFOR in its present form and with its present mandate, with the consent of the Croatian Government; deployment, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, of a much larger force to perform the same tasks; a substantial reduction of the peace-keeping force with a new mandate; and the withdrawal of all United Nations peace-keeping forces from Croatia.

67. The retention of UNPROFOR in its present form and with its present mandate would not enjoy the consent of the Government of Croatia. As recent experience has shown, peace-keeping without credible assurances of cooperation from all the parties concerned is undesirable and impracticable; it is unlikely to lead to success. It was equally clear that the Chapter VII option was not feasible either politically or in resource terms.

68. At the same time, the total withdrawal of all United Nations peace-keeping forces from Croatia would result immediately in a grave threat to peace and security extending beyond the borders of Croatia. The probability of major

renewed conflict was high and participation of Bosnian Serb forces and support from forces belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not be ruled out. Nor was it clear whether the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be continued without a substantial United Nations presence and support facilities in Croatia.

69. The maintenance of a reduced force in Croatia under a new mandate thus seemed the only way to reduce the risks of a renewed major war, while permitting continued progress in implementing the economic agreement and beginning political negotiations. I thus welcomed the joint announcement on 12 March 1995 by the President of Croatia and the Vice-President of the United States, which opened the way to a solution along these lines.

70. As soon as the United States authorities provided the necessary information about their negotiations with the Croatian Government, I instructed Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, acting as my Special Envoy, to conduct negotiations with the parties in order to define the mandate of a future United Nations peace-keeping force in Croatia that I could recommend to the Security Council in the knowledge that both parties would commit themselves to cooperate with that force in the implementation of its mandate.

71. It has become apparent from Mr. Stoltenberg's negotiations, with the support of UNPROFOR's civilian and military leadership, that an understanding on the details of the new mandate and the modalities of the United Nations peace-keeping operation requires further work. The gulf between the positions of the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities on the role and functions of the new force remains wide, and I am not yet in a position to inform the Council that the parties would accord it their practical cooperation. Further negotiations are therefore necessary.

72. I am, however, able to report that, in my view, the basis could be established for agreement that the mandate of the force should include the following functions:

(a) Support for implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994;

(b) Support for implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994;

(c) Implementation of those elements of the existing United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia that are accepted by both parties as having continuing relevance. These would include, but not be limited to, maintenance of a United Nations presence on the international borders of the Republic of Croatia and confidence-building and humanitarian tasks, such as assistance to refugees and displaced persons, protection of ethnic minorities, mine-clearance and convoy assistance.

In addition to this "core mandate", the new force would continue to perform functions arising from the accord on the Prevlaka peninsula and from relevant resolutions of the Security Council, such as those dealing with the monitoring of the "no-fly zone" and the extension of close air support in Croatia.

73. In advising the Security Council that I believe that agreement can be reached on a mandate comprising the above elements, I must stress that crucial differences remain between the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities with regard to the nature, size and functions of the force in the zone of separation and in the United Nations protected areas. In particular, the deployment patterns (e.g., fixed posts or mobile patrols or a combination of the two) and mode of functioning (e.g., monitor and report, as opposed to stop and search) of the United Nations force in the zone of separation and on the international borders require further discussion. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that UNPROFOR is already deployed in a monitoring function in the border areas, where it currently maintains 37 observation posts and 9 crossing-points with the cooperation of the local Krajina Serb authorities. Depending on the tasks finally agreed upon in the new mandate, a reduction from present troop levels would be possible, but it should be recognized that the capacity of the Force to react to developments would be commensurately lessened.

74. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's performance has been characterized by a mixture of achievements and setbacks. UNPROFOR has been successful in carrying out its mission in those areas where the parties have been willing to demonstrate good faith in implementing agreements and where the international community has provided a clear political context within which the mission can operate. A good example of the benefits of peace-keeping can be seen in UNPROFOR's achievements in the Federation, where considerable human resources have been devoted to building peace and enhancing tolerance and reconciliation between the parties through a variety of concrete measures designed to create conditions of normality for the general population. The facilitation of mutually beneficial joint economic projects to improve living conditions in central and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina has helped to lay a foundation of confidence and trust among a population that had previously witnessed some of the most intense fighting in the present conflict.

75. However, the failure of the Federation parties to address, in a practical manner, the fundamental issues of the return of displaced persons and of the Federation's institutional structures has limited UNPROFOR's ability to capitalize on the success achieved so far. The agreement signed in Bonn on 10 March 1995, calling for, among other things, the allocation of powers to federal bodies to the full extent stipulated in the Federation's Constitution, and a plan for the return of refugees and displaced persons, is a welcome development. UNPROFOR, with the assistance of the international community, stands ready to assist further in the development of joint economic development projects, expanded to include members of all ethnic communities in Federation territories.

76. Except in the area of Bihac, the cease-fire agreement of 23 December 1994 had, until recent days, been generally respected and has yielded tangible benefits for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, some provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, aimed at consolidating the cease-fire and the situation on the ground, have not, for the most part, been implemented. The areas of difficulty include persistent ethnic cleansing in the Banja Luka region; the continued security and humanitarian crisis in Bihac; increased firing at civilians and aircraft in Sarajevo; the denial of freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other international organizations; the

continued non-cooperation of the Bosnian Government with respect to the joint commissions; localized offensives and preparations for war by all parties; the continued closure of the Sarajevo airport roads; and the lack of progress on prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges.

77. The continued lack of trust between the parties and their unwillingness to break out of a vicious circle of linkages has made it difficult to achieve further progress in implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. In the absence of a real will by the parties to cooperate, UNPROFOR is unable to resolve outstanding issues among them. As a result, more than ever before, they are faced with the probability of renewed hostilities in the near future. The escalation of sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo, the increased obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the Bosnian Serbs, particularly of medical and fuel supplies to the enclaves, increasing restrictions of movement and the recent government offensives in the Travnik and Tuzla areas are some of the signs of a steady deterioration in the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR's inability to deter attacks on the designated safe area of Bihac brought to the fore some of the key issues addressed in my previous reports to the Council on the concept of safe areas. Until the Council is able to provide clear guidance on these matters, it is unlikely that the commitment of the parties or, therefore, UNPROFOR's performance in respect of the safe areas will improve and the danger will remain that situations such as that in Bihac will recur.

78. UNPROFOR has consistently emphasized that implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, and its extension, will largely depend on progress on the political front. Although UNPROFOR has done its part in stabilizing the situation on the ground, thereby providing the necessary space for political negotiations, the lack of political progress at the higher level has undermined the achievements gained so far. The current impasse on the Contact Group's proposal has created a vacuum in which the Force has little or no political context for the pursuit of local initiatives and in which the parties have little or no incentive to cooperate. While the Force continues with dedication to perform humanitarian and confidence-building tasks, the lack of progress on the fundamental political questions has created a situation in which it can do little but to delay rather than prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. This could have negative consequences for the future of the Federation, which cannot remain immune from the processes in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the mission area as a whole. There is, therefore, an overwhelming need for political progress to be achieved if further fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be avoided. I appeal to the members of the Contact Group to renew their efforts to fill the current vacuum.

79. During the past six months, relations between UNPROFOR and NATO have continued to be excellent. Close cooperation between the two organizations has continued despite the delicate balance required as a result of the different mandates and objectives of the two organizations. Under these conditions and in order to ensure continued fruitful cooperation, it remains essential that there be understanding of, and respect for, both the basic principle that NATO acts "in support of UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate" (to quote the language of Security Council resolution 836 (1993), para. 10) and the modalities for arbitrating possible differences in approach between the two organizations.

In an exchange of correspondence with the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, I have made it clear that, in the event that developments on the ground oblige me to undertake the withdrawal of United Nations personnel from any part of the theatre, it would be of great value to the United Nations to be able to call on the services of NATO, with the approval of the Security Council, to protect and if necessary conduct a withdrawal operation.

80. The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by a complex network of external and internal factors that contribute to economic and political uncertainty and rising social tension. UNPROFOR, acting within the good offices mandate given to my Special Representative by resolution 908 (1994) and in full cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as with other external organizations such as OSCE and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, has made a modest but important contribution to helping the authorities and various ethnic groups to maintain peace and stability and build a workable future. It is encouraging to note, in this first preventive peace-keeping mission, that both the Government and ethnic Albanian leaders have expressed appreciation to UNPROFOR for what they have termed its clear, objective, appropriate and helpful actions.

81. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues, however, to labour under the combined constraints of the economic blockade imposed by Greece and the effects of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the non-recognition of its borders by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and inter- and intra-ethnic tensions, all of which continue to undermine its stability and pose a threat to its fragile democracy. In addition to the persistent efforts of my Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Council has given specific political and military mandates to my Special Representative and UNPROFOR to contribute to the maintenance of the peace and stability in this Republic. The Council may also wish to call, in the context of Article 50 of the Charter, for increased international economic support, which would play a key role in contributing to future peace and stability there. If threats to the Republic's peace and stability, either external or internal, were to increase significantly and to such an extent that a new mandate and reinforcements were judged necessary, I would submit the appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

82. Throughout the duration of the mission, UNPROFOR has maintained a presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to discharge essential functions of political liaison and public information, along with tasks relevant to monitoring the Prevlaka peninsula, as mandated by resolution 779 (1992), and airfields, as mandated by paragraph 5 of resolution 786 (1992). UNPROFOR's presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the satisfactory level of cooperation with the federal authorities that its office in Belgrade enjoys, have proved to be vital for the effective functioning of all three of the operation's commands. It thus remains necessary to maintain a United Nations peace-keeping presence there, with the same functions as performed hitherto. In this regard, it is important that the federal Government extend to the United Nations force, its personnel, property funds and assets, the necessary privileges and immunities deriving from Article 105 (1) of the Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro) is a party and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations.

83. At this time of severe financial constraints, I am conscious of the high costs of UNPROFOR, which remains the largest peace-keeping operation ever fielded by the Organization and accounts for a substantial portion of its peace-keeping expenditures. I continue to examine ways to reduce costs, specifically in the organization of logistic support to UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command and in the supply and consumption of food and fuel. Compliance by the Governments of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their obligations to the international community would have a beneficial impact on the Organization's budget.

84. The Governments of Croatia and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have expressed the wish that the United Nations forces in their countries should be separate from UNPROFOR. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also expressed a wish for possible changes in the existing arrangements in that Republic. In order to respond to their wishes, but without compromising the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of an integrated United Nations peace-keeping effort in the theatre, I propose that the present United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) be replaced by three separate but interlinked peace-keeping operations: United Nations Peace Force - One (UNPF-1) in Croatia, United Nations Peace Force - Two (UNPF-2) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and United Nations Peace Force - Three (UNPF-3) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Each of the three operations would be headed by a civilian Chief of Mission at the assistant secretary-general level and would have its own military commander. In view of the interlinked nature of the problems in the area and in order to avoid the expense of duplicating existing structures, overall command and control of the three operations would be exercised by my Special Representative and a Theatre Force Commander commanding the military elements of the Force under his authority. Their theatre headquarters, known as United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ), would be in Zagreb and the administrative, logistical and public information responsibilities of the three operations would be coordinated there. UNPF-HQ would also be responsible for liaison with the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), other concerned Governments and NATO.

85. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council approve the following:

(a) The restructuring of UNPROFOR as described in paragraph 84 above;

(b) The negotiation, on the basis of the elements identified in paragraph 72 above, of a new mandate and functions for UNPF-1, which would be significantly smaller than the present UNPROFOR strength in Croatia. This mandate would extend until 30 November 1995 and would come into effect as soon as the Council approves a report from me containing the details of a recommended mandate and of undertakings by the two parties to cooperate in its implementation and confirming the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement with the Government of Croatia;

(c) The conversion, with immediate effect, of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into UNPF-2 and UNPF-3

respectively, with the same responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR has at present in those Republics and with mandates also extending to 30 November 1995;

(d) The appeals proposed in paragraphs 51 and 58 above to the Governments in the area to conclude status-of-forces agreements with the United Nations and to grant it suitable broadcasting facilities;

(e) The transfer to the three United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF-1, UNPF-2 and UNPF-3) of the applicability of all relevant Security Council resolutions and authorities relating to the functioning of UNPROFOR in the territories of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, respectively.

86. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, my Special Envoy, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Force Commander, General Bernard Janvier, his distinguished predecessor, General Bertrand de Lapresle, and the courageous and dedicated men and women of UNPROFOR for their devoted efforts in the service of the United Nations, and of peace, in the former Yugoslavia.

Annex I

Deployment of Units, military observers and civilian police monitors, as of 20 March 1995

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
1. Croatia				
(a) Headquarters, Zagreb-Belgrade	297 a/	30	48	
(b) United Nations protected areas and "pink zones"				
(i) Infantry units				
Sector East				
Belgium	769	33	138	
Russian Federation (1)	856			
Subtotal, Sector East	1 625			
Sector West				
Argentina	862	36	111	
Jordan (1)	1 028			
Nepal	898			
Subtotal, Sector West	2 788			
Sector North				
Denmark	953 b/	75	125	
Jordan (2)	1 004			
Ukraine (2)	555			
Poland	1 141			
Subtotal, Sector North	3 653			
Sector South				
Canada (1)	793	82	164	
Czech Republic	957			
Jordan (3)	1 251			
Kenya	974			
Subtotal, Sector South	3 975			
(ii) Support units				
Canadian Support Unit	425			

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
French Logistics Battalion	843			
Norwegian Movement Control Unit	111			
Netherlands logistics base	148			
Slovak Engineer Battalion	567			
Swedish Headquarters Company	128			
United States field hospital	299			
Finnish HQ Guard	43			
Indonesia Medical Battalion	220			
Subtotal, support units	2 784			
(c) Dubrovnik-Prevlaka		27		
(d) Highway patrols			145	
Total, Croatia	14 825	283	731	15 839
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina				
(a) Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters	155 c/	14	45 d/	
(i) Infantry units				
Sector Sarajevo		102		
HQ Sector Sarajevo	69 e/			
Egypt	418			
France (2)	833			
France (4)	854			
France (5)	882			
Russian Federation (2)	472			
Ukraine (1)	460			
Subtotal, Sector Sarajevo	3 988			
(ii) Support units				
French Headquarters Company	212			
French Medical Detachment	26			
French Air Operations Group (DETAIR)	252			
	490			

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
	Sector North-east		73		
	HQ Sector North-east	54 e/			
	Denmark	125			
	Sweden	1 030			
	Netherlands	730			
	Jordanian Radar	100			
	Pakistan (1)	1 385			
	Pakistan (2)	1 404			
	Pakistan National Support HQ	194			
	Subtotal, Sector North-east	5 022			
	Sector South-west		87		
	HQ Sector South-west	89 e/			
	United Kingdom (1)	698			
	United Kingdom (2)	543			
	United Kingdom Cavalry Battalion	264			
	Canada (2)	820			
	Malaysia	1 545			
	Spain	1 372			
	Turkey	1 469			
	New Zealand	249			
	Subtotal, Sector South-west	7 049			
	Bihac		29		
	HQ Bihac Area	13 d/			
	Bangladesh	1 238			
		1 251			
(iii)	Support units				
	Belgian Transport Company	100			
	Danish Headquarters Company	155			
	French Engineer	457			
	French Support Unit (DETALAT)	265			
	Netherlands Transport Battalion	328			

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
Netherlands Support Battalion	424			
Norwegian Helicopter Unit	40			
Norwegian Logistics Battalion	596			
United Kingdom, Combined British Forces	1 650			
Tuzla Airbase	24			
Subtotal, support units	4 039			
Total, Bosnia and Herzegovina	21 994	305	45	22 344
3. Airfield (no-fly zone) monitoring				
(a) Airfields		47		
Total, airfield monitoring		47		47
4. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia				
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command headquarters	53 a/	24	24	
Infantry units				
Nordic Battalion 1	556 f/			
United States Unit	540			
Total, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 096	24	24	1 146
Zagreb waiting deployment		25	3	
Total	37 915	684	803	39 402

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table)

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a/ Includes headquarters personnel.

b/ Includes 34 troops from Estonia and 33 troops from Lithuania.

c/ Excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters personnel from all Bosnia and Herzegovina Command national units.

d/ Includes the following UNCIVPOL:

Sarajevo Airport	11
Split Airport	4
Sarajevo Sector headquarters	10
Mostar	4
Gornij Vakuf	2
Gorazde	7
Srebrenica	5
Tuzla	2

e/ Excludes headquarters personnel.

f/ Nordic Battalion 1 (NORDBATT 1)

Danish	44
Finnish	427
Norwegian	46
Swedish	39

Annex II

Casualty list as of 20 March 1995

Military personnel

	Croatia				Bosnia and Herzegovina Command	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command	Other areas	Total
	Sector East	Sector West	Sector North	Sector South				
Hostile actions								
Fatal	3	3	6	7	35	0	0	54
Total	35	19	43	75	378	0	7	557
Other casualties								
Fatal	2	8	9	5	19	0	9	52
Total	42	41	31	30	148	12	77	381
Traffic casualties								
Fatal	2	2	3	6	26	1	3	47
Total	39	52	48	51	192	6	40	428
Totals								
Fatal	7	13	18	18	80	1	12	149
Total	116	112	122	156	718	18	124	1 366

Annex III

Strength by country

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	862	7	23
Bangladesh	1 242	42	37
Belgium	878	6	0
Brazil	0	34	6
Canada	2 058	15	45
Colombia	0	0	12
Czech Republic	957	32	0
Denmark	1 223	15	45
Egypt	433	22	34
Estonia	34	0	0
Finland	470	12	10
France	4 676	10	41
Ghana	0	32	0
Indonesia	220	25	15
Ireland	0	9	20
Jordan	3 383	48	71
Kenya	874	46	50
Lithuania	33	0	0
Malaysia	1 552	25	25
Nepal	898	5	50
Netherlands	1 676	48	10
New Zealand	254	9	0
Nigeria	0	31	68
Norway	821	42	30
Pakistan	2 993	33	18
Poland	1 141	30	29
Portugal	2	12	41
Russian Federation	1 336	22	33
Senegal	0	0	18

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Slovakia	567	0	0
Spain	1 394	19	0
Sweden	1 209	18	35
Switzerland	0	6	6
Tunisia	0	0	12
Turkey	1 478	0	0
Ukraine	1 035	10	19
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3 273	19	0
United States of America	843	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0
Total	37 915	684	803


The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
AUSTRIA
ITALY
SLOVENIA
Ljubljana
SAN MARINO
ADRIATIC SEA
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة للحماية في آذار/مارس ١٩٩٥
1995年3月联保部队的部署
UNPROFOR DEPLOYMENT AS OF MARCH 1995
DEPLOIEMENT DE LA FORPRONU AU MOIS DE MARS 1995
РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ СООНО ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА МАРТ 1995
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNPROFOR EN MARZO DE 1995
0 50 100 150 km
0 50 100 mi
Map No. 3684 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
March 1995

HUNGARY
ROMANIA
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
SERBIA
OF
YUGOSLAVIA
(Serbia and Montenegro)
VOJVODINA
MONTENEGRO
KOSOVO
Beograd
(Belgrade)
Vidin
Sofia
BULGARIA
Skopje
Tirana
ALBANIA
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
GREECE
Pecs
SLOVENGBATT
BELBATT
ARGBATT
INDOBATT
USRATT
NORBATT
Danube
Lake Ohrid
Lake Dojran
United Nations Protected Areas
Zones protégées par les Nations Unies
Районы, охраняемые Организацией Объединенных Наций
Zonas Protegidas por las Naciones Unidas
Pink Zones
Monitored No-Fly Zone Airport
UNPROFOR (Croatia)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNPROFOR (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)